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ZNR UUUUU
R 090324Z OCT 86
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TO ANEMBASSY/ISLAMABAD PK
RUCLEKA/CDR9THPSYOPBN FT BRAGG NC//AFVS-POG-N-SSN//
RUYLBAH/DODSPECREP CKINAWA JA
RAYWYB/JIC CAMBERRA AS
RUEHIN/ANEMBASSY BONN//GROBEL & EDGAR JCA//
RUDOMKE/FBIS LONDON UK
RUESFV/FBIS VIENNA AU
RUHJFBA/FBIS OKINAWA JA
RUEHMY/ANEMBASSY MOSCOW
RUEAIJU/MPIC WASHINGTON DC//IEG EXEC OFF//
RUEAIDF/OD&E FIELD OFFICE WASHINGTON DC
RUSKNCR/USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE//ECJ2//
RUFHVI/ANEMBASSY VIENNA
RUDOMAB/FBIS LONDON UK//BBC//
RUFHLD/ANEMBASSY LONDON//ATTN MCCORMACK, CARY//
RUDKSA/ANEMBASSY SOFIA
RUEHFG/ANEMBASSY PRAGUE
RUFHEB/ANEMBASSY BERLIN
RUDKDR/ANEMBASSY BUDAPEST
RUDKRW/ANEMBASSY WARSAW
RUFHBE/ANEMBASSY BELGRADE
RUGAID/USEUCOM AIDES VAHINGEN GE
RUEKJCS/DEFINTAGENCY WASH DC
RUEBMAA/STORAGE CENTER FBIS WASHINGTON DCC
RUWTHOA/HQ SPACECND PETERSON AFB CO//ATTN POLAD//
RUFHMB/USDEL MBFR VIENNA AU//PAA//
RHAKAAA/18TFW KADENA AB JA//IN//
RHMARA/6922 ESS CLARK AB RP
RUFHGVV/USMISSION GENEVA//START//
RUFHGVV/USMISSION GENEVA//INF//
RUFHGVV/USMISSION GENEVA//DEFENSE/SPACE//
RUFHGVV/USMISSION GENEVA//SCC//
RUFHGVV/USMISSION GENEVA//DISARDEL//
RUDORRA/USNMR SIAPE BE//PIO//
ACCT FBWA-EWDK

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EZ1:

UNCLAS LD PHU

EZ2:

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SUBJ

<> FBIS TRENDS -- 3 OCT 86 -- USSR-U.S.<><>-AFGHANISTAN<><>

WAO82125

FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE MEDIA ANALYSIS

<> MOSCOW HINTS AT POSSIBLE DISCUSSION OF <><>AFGHANISTAN<><> AT SUMMIT
SUMMARY

<> MOSCOW HAS INDICATED THAT IT IS PREPARED TO DISCUSS REGIONAL ISSUES, INCLUDING <><>AFGHANISTAN<><>, AT THE REYKJAVIK SUMMIT AND HINTED THAT IT MAY BE PREPARING SOME NEW GESTURE DESIGNED TO FACILITATE A FURTHER REDUCTION IN SOVIET TROOPS AFTER SIX REGIMENTS ARE WITHDRAWN AS PROMISED BY GORBACHEV LAST JULY.

WHILE MOSCOW HAS MADE IT CLEAR THAT ARMS CONTROL IS AT THE CENTER OF THE SOVIET AGENDA FOR REYKJAVIK, IT HAS INDICATED ITS READINESS TO DISCUSS REGIONAL ISSUES AS WELL. FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE, IN HIS 30 SEPTEMBER PRESS CONFERENCE ANNOUNCING THE SUMMIT, SAID THAT "IT IS NOT RULED OUT" THAT BILATERAL ISSUES AND "REGIONAL CONFLICTS" WOULD BE ON THE AGENDA. FOREIGN MINISTRY SPOKESMAN BORIS PYADYSEV REITERATED THIS POINT AT A MOSCOW PRESS CONFERENCE THE FOLLOWING DAY, REPORTED BY PRAVDA.

<> ALTHOUGH SOVIET MEDIA HAVE NOT SAID SO DIRECTLY, THERE ARE STRONG INDICATIONS THAT MOSCOW EXPECTS <><>AFGHANISTAN<><> TO BE DISCUSSED. SHEVARDNADZE, IN REMARKS AT A 2 OCTOBER PRESS CONFERENCE IN OTTAWA
<> REPORTED BY WESTERN MEDIA, AFFIRMED THE POSSIBILITY THAT <><>AFGHANISTAN<><> WOULD BE ON THE REYKJAVIK AGENDA. MOREOVER, ON 6 OCTOBER, SOVIET TELEVISION BROADCAST A DISCUSSION OF THE SUMMIT BY PROMINENT INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS SPECIALISTS WHO HINTED BROADLY THAT
<> <><>AFGHANISTAN<><> WOULD FIGURE IN THE TALKS. IN AN EXCHANGE CLEARLY CONTRIVED TO SUGGEST THAT POSSIBILITY, YEVGENIY PRIMAKOV, A CENTRAL COMMITTEE CANDIDATE MEMBER AND DIRECTOR OF THE INFLUENTIAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES INSTITUTE OF WORLD ECONOMY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (IMEHO), ASSERTED THAT REGIONAL CONFLICTS WOULD "PROBABLY BE RAISED" IN REYKJAVIK. PROGRAM MODERATOR VALENTIN ZORIN THEN IMPLICITLY
<> HIGHLIGHTED DISCUSSION OF <><>AFGHANISTAN<><> BY ASKING PRIMAKOV TO "DWELL IN PARTICULAR ON EVENTS" THERE.

NEW INITIATIVE?

<> THE INDICATIONS OF SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS <><>AFGHANISTAN<><> AT THE REYKJAVIK MEETING COME AMID SIGNS THAT MOSCOW IS CONTEMPLATING ADDITIONAL MEASURES TO FACILITATE A WITHDRAWAL OF ITS FORCES FROM
<> <><>AFGHANISTAN<><>, OR IS AT LEAST TRYING TO LIMIT ITS INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC RELATIONS LIABILITIES BY DEMONSTRATING AN INTENTION OF GETTING OUT. IN HIS 23 SEPTEMBER SPEECH AT THE UNITED NATIONS, PUBLISHED IN PRAVDA ON THE 24TH, SHEVARDNADZE TOOK UNUSUAL STEPS TO EMPHASIZE
<> MOSCOW'S INTEREST IN SEEKING NEW WAYS TO RESOLVE THE <><>AFGHANISTAN<><> CONFLICT. HE CLAIMED THAT THE <><>AFGHAN<><> REGIME'S "SOCIAL BASE IS CONSTANTLY BECOMING BROADER AND STRONGER" AND THAT THE REGIME HAS "THE SUPPORT AND PARTICIPATION OF ALL SOCIAL STRATA . . . WITHOUT EXCEPTION." BASED ON THIS UNUSUALLY OPTIMISTIC APPRAISAL OF THE

<> <><>DRA<><>'S VIABILITY, HE DECLARED THAT THE SOVIET UNION "IS IN FAVOR OF SEEKING NEW SOLUTIONS AND A FRESH APPROACH, UNOBSCURED BY PREJUDICE," THAT WOULD HELP "IDENTIFY WAYS OF SOLVING THE PROBLEM."

<> NO SOVIET LEADER IS KNOWN TO HAVE PREVIOUSLY CALLED FOR "NEW" OR "FRESH" APPROACHES TO THE <><>AFGHANISTAN<><> ISSUE. IN HIS UN SPEECH A YEAR EARLIER SHEVARDNADZE HAD REPEATED THE STANDARD SOVIET POSITION THAT A SETTLEMENT WOULD ONLY BE POSSIBLE WHEN "OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE IS ENDED AND ITS NONRESUMPTION GUARANTEED," AND MADE NO CLAIM THAT THE <><>DRA<><> WAS BECOMING STRONG ENOUGH TO HANDLE ITS OWN AFFAIRS. EVEN GORBACHEV, IN HIS 25 FEBRUARY CPSU CONGRESS REPORT ANNOUNCING THE EXISTENCE OF A TIMETABLE FOR SOVIET TROOP REDUCTION AND IN HIS 28 JULY VLADIVOSTOK SPEECH ANNOUNCING THE PLANNED WITHDRAWAL OF SIX REGIMENTS, GAVE NO INDICATION OF AN OPENNESS TO NEW SOLUTIONS OR MADE SUCH STRONG CLAIMS THAT THE <><>DRA<><>'S POLICY OF SEEKING WIDER SUPPORT IS WORKING. IN FACT, AT THE 27TH CONGRESS HE ALLEGED THAT <><>AFGHANISTAN<><> HAD BECOME A "RUNNING SORE."

<> MOSCOW'S EMPHASIS ON THE INCREASED STABILITY AND POPULARITY OF THE <><>KABUL<><> REGIME--WHETHER FACT OR FICTION -- MAY BE PARTIALLY DESIGNED TO JUSTIFY FURTHER UNILATERAL ACTIONS TO REDUCE THE SOVIET MILITARY ROLE IN <><>AFGHANISTAN<><>. IN HIS 6 OCTOBER TELEVISION REMARKS, PRIMAKOV DREW AN UNUSUALLY DIRECT LINKAGE BETWEEN THE REGIME'S PURPORTEDLY IMPROVING STAYING POWER AND THE PROSPECT OF BRINGING SOVIET TROOPS HOME. PRIMAKOV OUTLINED "TWO PRACTICAL POSSIBILITIES" FOR WITHDRAWING SOVIET TROOPS. THE FIRST TYPIFIED THE CONVENTIONAL SOVIET POSITION -- ARTICULATED BY GORBACHEV AT THE 27TH CONGRESS AND REITERATED IN HIS VLADIVOSTOK SPEECH -- THAT THERE WOULD BE A RELATIVELY SPEEDY DEPARTURE IF A SYSTEM OF GUARANTEES IS SET UP AGAINST OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE. HE WENT ON TO ARGUE, HOWEVER, THAT EVEN IF SUCH INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEES ARE NOT FORTHCOMING, SOVIET TROOPS WILL BE WITHDRAWN ONE WAY OR THE OTHER IF THE SITUATION IN <><>AFGHANISTAN<><> IS STABILIZED" THROUGH THE EFFORTS OF THE <><>KABUL<><> REGIME.

<> THAT STABILIZATION, PRIMAKOV ASSERTED, "IS NOW OCCURRING" THROUGH THE "BROADENING OF THE <><>AFGHAN<><> REGIME'S SOCIAL BASE." HE RECITED EVIDENCE OF THE REGIME'S PROGRESS IN WINNING THE ALLEGIANCE OF FORMER INSURGENTS AND CLAIMED THAT THE <><>AFGHAN<><> ARMY AND SECURITY FORCES ARE "ACQUIRING INCREASING STRENGTH" AND "POPULAR SUPPORT."

BACKGROUND

<> ALTHOUGH MOSCOW HAS PUSHED <><>KABUL<><> TO BROADEN ITS POPULAR SUPPORT EVER SINCE THE 1979 INVASION, THE GORBACHEV REGIME HAS PURSUED THAT GOAL WITH PARTICULAR VIGOR, EVIDENTLY IN AN EFFORT TO COOPT OR NEUTRALIZE KEY OPPOSITION GROUPS AND ENHANCE THE REGIME'S ABILITY TO STAND ON ITS OWN. UNDER APPARENT SOVIET PRESSURE, FORMER <><>AFGHAN<><> PARTY LEADER BABRAK KARMAI LAST NOVEMBER UNVEILED A PLAN FOR WIDENING HIS REGIME'S DOMESTIC SUPPORT THAT INCLUDED BRINGING NONPARTY REPRESENTATIVES INTO THE GOVERNMENT, INVITING THOSE WHO HAVE FLED THE COUNTRY TO RETURN "WITHOUT PREJUDICE AND DISTINCTION," AND APPEALING TO NATIONALITIES AND ISLAMIC RELIGIOUS LEADERS FOR SUPPORT IN EXCHANGE FOR PROTECTION OF THEIR RIGHTS. THEN, IN AN EFFORT TO INSTALL MORE EFFECTIVE LEADERSHIP, MOSCOW APPARENTLY ENGINEERED THE OUSTING OF KARMAI FROM THE TOP PARTY POST LAST MAY AND REPLACED HIM WITH FORMER STATE SECURITY CHIEF NAJIBULLAH. IT HAS

PLAYED UP NAJIBULLAH'S EFFORTS TO REHAKE THE PARTY AND IMPLEMENT THE PROGRAM FOR BROADENING ITS BASE OF SUPPORT. IN HIS VLADIVOSTOK SPEECH, GORBACHEV EXPRESSED SUPPORT FOR THE "LINE OF THE CURRENT <> <><>AFGHAN<><> LEADERSHIP TOWARD NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AND EXPANDING THE SOCIAL BASE" OF THE REVOLUTION "RIGHT UP TO THE POINT OF CREATING A GOVERNMENT INVOLVING PARTICIPATION BY POLITICAL FORCES WHO HAVE BEEN OUTSIDE THE COUNTRY" BUT WHO ARE NOW "SINCERELY READY" TO CONSTRUCT A "NEW <><>AFGHANISTAN<><>."

THE MOST RECENT EXAMPLE OF THIS EFFORT--AND OF MOSCOW'S ENCOURAGEMENT OF IT--CAME LAST MONTH, WHEN <><>KABUL<><> ANNOUNCED THE FORMATION OF A NATIONAL RECONCILIATION COMMISSION. ACCORDING TO A LAUDATORY ACCOUNT PUBLISHED IN PRAVDA ON 30 SEPTEMBER, THE COMMISSION IS SUPPOSED TO FURTHER THE "RESTORATION OF PEACE AND SECURITY INSIDE THE <><>DRA<><>" AND HELP THE "STRUGGLE AGAINST INTERFERENCE FROM THE FORCES OF IMPERIALISM AND REACTION." THE NEW COMMISSION IS ATTACHED TO THE NATIONAL FATHERLAND FRONT, A NONPARTY ORGANIZATION CREATED IN 1981 TO UNITE <><>AFGHANS<><> IN SUPPORT OF THE GOVERNMENT BUT WHICH HAS BEEN CRITICIZED IN <><>AFGHAN<><> MEDIA FOR INEFFECTIVENESS. AS A FURTHER INDICATION THAT <><>KABUL<><> IS ATTEMPTING TO INVIGORATE THE FRONT, IT RECENTLY ANNOUNCED THAT THE FRONT'S FIRST CONGRESS SINCE THE FOUNDING CONGRESS IN 1981 WILL BE HELD AT THE END OF OCTOBER.

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